People are the most valuable asset of any business, but they are also the most unpredictable, and the most difficult asset to manage. And although managing people well is critical to the health of any organization, most managers don't get the training they need to make good management decisions. Now, award-winning authors and renowned management Professors Mike Useem and Peter Cappelli of the Wharton School have designed this course to introduce you to the key elements of managing people. Based on their popular course at Wharton, this course will teach you how to motivate individual performance and design reward systems, how to design jobs and organize work for high performance, how to make good and timely management decisions, and how to design and change your organization’s architecture. By the end of this course, you'll have developed the skills you need to start motivating, organizing, and rewarding people in your organization so that you can thrive as a business and as a social organization.
Lessons from the Japanese and US Auto Industries
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來自 University of Pennsylvania 的課程
Managing Social and Human Capital
1046 個評分
從本節課中
Tasks, Jobs, and Systems of Work
This module is designed to teach you the difference between a task and a job. You'll learn how jobs are historically designed, and you'll explore some of the drawbacks related to past work systems. You'll also learn how job design has been influenced by engineering and psychology. Finally, you'll look at real world examples from the GM and Toyota to compare their respective approaches. By the end of this module, you'll understand how jobs and systems of work have evolved to improve employee performance and productivity.
與講師見面
Michael UseemProfessor of Management and Director of the Center for Leadership and Change Management
The Wharton School
Peter CappelliProfessor of Management, Director, Center for Human Resources
The Wharton School
So let's find out what they did.
And the lessons begin in the auto industry, and
particularly the rise of the Japanese auto industry in the US gets
going in the 1970s because of the oil price shocks.
OPEC raised oil prices in 1973 and again in 1979 by a lot.
And that meant that if you had a car that used a lot of gas,
suddenly became very difficult for you to pay for it.
More to the point,
in some of those periods we actually had rationing in the United States.
If you had a car with an even license plate, you could only buy gas on Tuesday,
Thursday and Saturday, right?
So, suddenly, having a car that was fuel efficient really mattered.
The Japanese cars came into the US because they were smaller, much more fuel
efficient, and they started to take market share away from US cars which were big.
But the other thing that US consumers learned, and eventually US auto companies
as well, was that the Japanese cars were not only more fuel efficient,
the quality of them, the build quality especially, was way better.
The cars lasted long and they didn't have nearly the problems that US cars had.
There used to be a kind of a, it wasn't really a joke, it was true,
practice in the US that you could order a car and
you could decide what day of the week the car you're ordering should be built.
And you wanted a Wednesday car.
And the reason you wanted a Wednesday car was by Thursday and especially Friday,
people were starting to party in the plants before the weekend.
And some of them also were just cutting out of work and so they were trying to
throw replacement workers in to get that work done, so quality was lousy on Friday.
And on Monday a lot of people were hang over and
would come in with rough shape for the first day or two.
So you didn't want a Monday or Tuesday car either, you wanted a Wednesday car.
Unless you bought a Japanese car and
then it didn't matter because the quality was pretty good for those cars.
So we started to pay some attention to what do the Japanese know that we don't?
And here's one of the most important industrial stories of
the 20th century, and it happened at General Motors.
In the early 1980s, the US auto industry is whacked by Japanese competition.
Ford is struggling, Chrysler is bankrupt and is bailed about by the government.
General Motors has still got some money and they're trying to
figure out what they should do to address the problem of Japanese competition.
So they went to Japan and they toured the plants there and
they came back with this profound sense of how engaged the Japanese workers were,
in their view, engaged with management, to produce high quality cars.
How hard they worked,
how diligently they were and particularly how concerned they were about quality.
And they came back to the US, looked at their own workforce and
concluded there's no way we're going to compete with the Japanese
because their workers are just so much better than ours are.
So we just can't compete with the Japanese car companies on that.
The only way we're going to be able to make it is to automate.
We're going to bring in robots to replace as many workers as possible.
So GM embarked on a huge industrial experiment,
it turned out, to put robots in their factories.
They spent a ton of money,
as I recall, about $43 billion, putting robots into their factories.
Now the reason that figure matters is because it was more than the entire value
of Toyota Motor Company at that time.
So General Motors could of bought Toyota for the amount of money they spent
putting robots into plants to get rid of workers, okay.
That's the experiment they start down in the early 1980s.
At the same time, something quirky happens.
General Motors' got an empty plant in Fremont, California.
Toyota needs to start building cars in the US because of protectionist concerns.
Auto workers, auto companies, particularly,
lobbying Congress to put constraints on the imports of Japanese cars
because they're taking all our business.
So Toyota's looking around for a place to build cars and
General Motors' got this empty factory in Fremont.
So they agreed to basically lease the plant to Toyota.
Toyota's going to run it and
they're going to produce a car that they will sell through Chevrolet.
And the car is going to be the Nova, and it's really going to
be a Toyota Corolla except it's got a Nova badge stamped on it.
Toyota design, Toyota manufactured.
Toyota sends over its managers and starts this plant up again.
It uses the equipment of General Motors, so 1970-style equipment,
no robots in this plant.
But what's different is the way they manage the employees.
They hire back most of their workforce from the old GM workforce,
okay, but they hire them in differently.
They bring them in slowly and carefully, they spend a lot of time training them and
persuading them that the plant needs to run in a different way.
Includes sending some of these workers to Japan,
so they can look around and see how Japanese plants work and
persuade them that you really could do things differently.
Well to cut to the chase of this story,
within a short period of time, the plant in Fremont,
called the New United Motors Manufacturing Incorporated, or NUMMI,
this plant is now the most productive plant in the General Motors chain.
It is also the highest quality plant in the General Motors chain.
So if you're the General Motors treasurer and you're thinking about this and
you just put $43 billion into plants to get rid of workers.
And you've got Toyota that has come in and
taken your former workers and your former plant, and
is building cars with higher quality and higher productivity than your robots are,
you gotta recognized that you've made a profound mistake, right?
And to some extent many people in the US sort of got this, not everybody and
not everybody in auto industry got this, but it's pretty powerful lesson.
So let's talk about what the Japanese approach
looked like from the perspective just of work.
There are other courses in the program that talk a little bit about
what the Japanese Toyota system of lean production meant for
inventory issues and organization of a plant.
But from the perspective of work, the big changes were that the individual
workers in their teams now controlled the decisions that Frederick Taylor's
engineers used to make about how to design their jobs, right?
They got lots of feedback about quality and
productivity of their particular part of the assembly operations.
So not each worker by themselves, maybe five or
six of them in one part of the assembly line, they get to control,
at least a large part, of how their work gets done.
And they see how they're doing in terms of the quality of their inputs and
how much they're able to turn out on their part of the assembly line.
So the control they're given is to redesign their jobs in ways that improve
quality and improve productivity.
They're in charge, they kind of own this, right?
And the interesting thing about this is the tasks that they design
are just as boring as the ones that Frederick Taylor would have designed,
but they control them.
They have to do them in exactly the same way every time in order to know
when they introduce an innovation whether it's an improvement or not, right?
So they're really standardized, but they control it.
And this and a bunch of other reasons like the fact that the management team
treated them a little more like peers, common cafeteria, common uniform for
everybody, meant that the employees were much more engaged in their work.
Turnover was low, quality in particular was way higher and
the employees are striving to improve productivity almost all the time.
So this is the lesson of Japanese management,
that it turned out that Frederick Taylor wasn't right,
that trying to get engineers to design the jobs for people was not optimal.
And that they could probably do a better job themselves, and if nothing else,
they're at least much more engaged in it.
Now what's the downside of this Toyota lean production system?
The downside for management is that the workers are in control now.
You don't have a group of engineers who are part of management designing
everything.
The workers in the plant are in charge.
And one of the things that Japanese style management does very differently and
noticeably on assembly lines is it gives the individual worker
the power to stop the line if there are quality problems.
Because they want them fixed then,
they don't want more cars coming off with quality problems.
And the idea of letting an individual worker shut down an assembly line,
to US managers, seemed insane.
It cost about $50,000 a minute to shut down an assembly line, right, but the idea
of giving them the control to do that seemed crazy, and that's the trade off.
If you engage workers, you have to give them some control over what they're doing.
And in that sense, it's very much the opposite of the story we told at
the beginning of the series about Mother's Restaurant in New Orleans.
The one where you had people standing over the shoulder of the cashier trying to make
sure nobody's cheating.
In the Toyota system, a lean production,
the supervisors are not there watching people.
The employees are making the decisions themselves and
if they decided to screw things up, it would be really hard to stop them, right?
If they started stopping the assembly line just to irritate the management team,
it would be really difficult.
So some of the resistance that US managers brought to adopting these
practices from Japan were partly not invented here, just common.
But also we don't trust the workers enough to give them the control that would
be necessary to get them to perform in a much more effective way.
So where else do we see organizations adopting models like this,
like the lean production system?
Well, you see it a lot in healthcare now where there's a recognition that teams
of workers are really the important unit.
The nurses and doctors have to work together with technicians.
They gotta be talking to each other.
They ought to be making decisions about the best way to provide care
at the patient's bed.
You see it in some notable other examples.
One of them is Southwest Airlines,
which is a company that has a very different way of doing things.
Their particular problem which initiated almost randomly was that they
were about to go out of business and they had to sell one of their airplanes.
The very early days of the airline, they had four planes,
they had to sell one of them.
And they went to the employees and say, we gotta figure out a way to operate the same
route schedule with three planes rather than four.
And the only way you could do that is if you turn the planes around faster
at each airport, right.
So you’re not spending as much time at the gate, you’re getting in,
you’re getting out fast.
And if you can do that, it’s incredibly cheaper, more productive,
you don’t need as many planes, a plane is a really expensive thing.
So the employees figured out how to do that and
it’s really a way of just cooperating with each other.
Different workgroups that under the Taylor system would never talk to each other,
baggage handlers, gate agents, pilots,
each separately managed and in their own little world, right,
now trying to work together in order to solve problems and coordinate, right.
So one of the things you notice about Southwest which you don't notice for
a lot of other airlines is that you rarely pull up to the gate and
surprise the crew there, right?
It's often the case of other airlines,
you pull in and nobody is there to greet the plane
because they're in a separate workgroup following their own schedule, right.
Maybe the plane got in a little early.
You would like these people to be able to talk to each other and communicate.
And to that you can’t have supervisors necessarily standing over them and
telling them what to do.
Well, that also means, again, if the employees are in charge and
they’re in control, that they’re better be happy.
And if they get unhappy with you, you got a big problem, right,
because they could shut the thing down in a heartbeat.
So Southwest, in particular, spends a lot of time making sure their employees they
are happy and making sure that they're happy with the airline so that they will
engage their discretionary effort, which is a key phrase in management.
That is the kinds of things they could do if they wanted to do,
but they probably don't have to do, and it's hard to make them do it, right?
And that is solve problems when they see them happening,
without a supervisor having to come over and tell them what to do, right.
But for management this is often pretty scary because you are giving up control to
the employees, particularly the employees that you're supposed to be supervising.
Now if you can do it, you see an enormous productivity improvement like this, and
that productivity improvement is you don't need as many supervisors, right, and
they're pretty expensive.
