[MUSIC] [MUSIC] With the case of the Nile River Basin, we will look closely at an example which illustrates perfectly the concept of hydro-hegemony and the power relations upstream and downstream of a river basin. The Nile is the longest river in Africa, its drainage basins represents 10% of the African continent. It is shared by 11 countries, and its two tributaries, the Blue Nile, which originates in Ethiopia, and the White Nile, which originates in Rwanda bring a considerable amount of water to Egypt, which is the country situated downstream. The White Nile represents 30% of the Nile flow to its estuary, while the Blue Nile represents 70%. In this case, we will see that the position of Egypt downstream, is a hydro-hegemon position provided primarily by the law, by rights gained historically in the colonial period. The first treaty to confirm this dominant position of Egypt is the treaty of 1902. This treaty prohibits, for example, Ethiopia which is located upstream, to develop water projects. It was in 1929 that the Egyptian position is endorsed further with an agreement that gave Egypt quotas and exclusive access rights to water resources. This agreement also allows Egypt to veto water projects developed by the states further upstream. Of course, it will be denounced by states such as Uganda and Kenya who condemn an agreement which encourages an asymmetric position, of hegemony, on the basis of colonial legitimacy and not on the basis of regional political negotiations. And there is a third agreement that endorses the dominant position of Egypt even more. The 1959 Agreement. This was negotiated following a brief conflict between Egypt and Sudan. It endorses the dominant position of Egypt, and leaves room in Sudan for sharing water resources. Indeed this agreement states that Egypt is entitled to 58 million cubic meters of water per year for its own use, and Sudan, 18 million cubic meters. All other riparian countries upstream, the nine other riparian countries are not at all affected by this agreement, which, finally, gives, offers to the two countries downstream almost all of the water quota of the Nile Basin. We see the concept of hydro-hegemony. The downstream countries may be, in some cases, the most powerful. So I suggest that we now go into more detail on the position of Egypt, and understand better this dominant position. Egypt is the regional superpower, on the technical, economic and military level. As we have seen, this is a key issue, one of the key dimensions of hydro-hegemony, and this power relation, begins following the independence of Egypt, in the 1940s, 1950s, after the war, when it was decided to create the Aswan High Dam, the technological device, the large infrastructure, which will allow Egypt to be autonomous in terms of energy production and therefore its industrial capacity. The Aswan High Dam was decided in 1948 and it was inaugurated in 1971. It can store over 169 billion cubic metres of water that will enable Egypt to develop its agricultural sector but also to establish its rapid urbanization, allowing access to clean water. In contrast, some dams were built upstream in Sudan under the Egyptian-British protectorate, and they deal with only six billion cubic metres in contrast with the 169 billion cubic meters of the great Egyptian infrastructure. The position and technological superiority of Egypt, until recently, has been extremely strong. Egypt benefits from its 55, 58 billion cubic meters linked to its quota, but it also benefits from six billion cubic meters that Sudan does not use. This quota was set by the 1959 Agreement and is now the subject of many questions. We'll come back to this in the next sequence. The Egyptian economy is therefore an economy based on hydraulic development, on the development of hydropower, with the dam, but also on its water storage capacity that will benefit the economic development of the country. The second point which helps to qualify dependence and the economic exploitation of the resource, is population growth. As I already mentioned, there is a rapid rate of urbanization in Egypt. Even at present, population growth is at two per cent. This means that it is concentrated in areas such as the Nile Delta which is dependent on an abundant water resource for drinking water and for the survival of these urban populations. Egypt and the Nile Delta are among the most densely populated areas of the world with growth that will take this urban area, this conurbation of the Nile Delta, from 80 million to 100 million inhabitants by 2025, and which justifies the ever increasing need for water. There is a risk of water shortage in the Nile Delta but across the whole of Egypt we can understand that it is a matter of concern for the Egyptian state. Aside from the hydroelectric and industrial, and the demographic issues just seen, the third point is agricultural development which is extremely water-intensive and has been since the 1950s. The Egyptian agricultural sector accounts for 30% of the workforce. And it is founded on intensive agricultural developments and especially on agriculture located in the desert, in agricultural oases artificially fed thanks to the creation of channels to irrigate crops. Again, it's the economic development of Egypt which is at stake, one of its primary activity sectors. We can see through these three issues, demographic, agricultural, industrial and energy, that Egypt depends, very strongly, on water, for its own development. So that is all on the question of economic and industrial potential which make up one dimension of Egyptian hydro-hegemony. The second dimension is power. This is built, as I have already mentioned, it is built, and it is clear that Egypt's position is dominant in many respects in terms of power, compared with other upstream countries. Firstly, Egypt has an advantageous position thanks to international agreements. As mentioned, the quotas clearly gave a right to the resource for many years. For they have no fixed term, a priori, these international agreements. In terms of authority and power, the issue of water security is quite central in Egypt. This will politicize, secure, and make water a strategic issue, since the Nasser regime post-war. Here we find three quotes. One from Sadate, who was once Egyptian president, one from Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who, prior to being Secretary General of the United Nations, was the Egyptian foreign minister and a third quote from Hosni Moubarak before his dismissal. All three can be seen clearly giving central importance to water, as a potential object of conflict or as a strategic issue in regards to neighbouring countries. We examined in depth the case of Egypt, which allows us to see, and to better understand its hydro-hegemon position. And its relationship, absolutely vital, securitized, to the Nile resource. In the next sequence we will focus on the upstream countries and their strategies and how do they accommodate this dominant position vis-à-vis the power and strength of Egypt. [MUSIC]