Well I think we have to take the question of vulnerability and cyber security of these electronic metabolizes in a stepwise manner, we have to deconstruct that. There's too many elements in this kind of analysis to just lump it all together. So for example, let's say we're talking about a standalone medical device that one would not expect to be connected to anything else. One might assume that that device is not vulnerable from a cyber security standpoint. However, many standalone medical devices that are not networked in day-to-day operation are still connected to a computer intermittently, perhaps to upload a patch or to change configuration or to perform some other modification. And so there are possibilities that a connect computer especially when running a standard operating system with no vulnerabilities could potentially transmit [INAUDIBLE] that device when it is connected even if it is intermittent. So we shouldn't categorize the risk at cyber security related risk to only those devices where they're constantly your intimate network as part of a typical network system wired or wireless. That's one thing we should think about. The other is that it's theoretically possible to connect to USB drive to a device. That's a stand-alone, non-network device. Now, we also have to remember, put into context, that most of these are theoretical concerns, with very little evidence that there have been problems related to these, to these potential vulnerabilities. Now the lack of evidence of problems doesn't necessarily mean that there haven't been any. And also, there may not be any great interest in someone performing some nefarious activity and affecting a medical device. Especially when that is difficult to access, located in a hospital in a semi-secure location. And where there may not be anything interesting worth doing to that device. There may or may not be protected health information on devices. So we should dig into that more, especially the PHI aspect in the medical devices. But I think step-wise, don't exclude devices that are not continuously networked from potentially being affected by cyber vulnerabilities. The second, of course, is there's general concern that in the world of medical devices, just as in the world of our networked computers. That networking greatly increases the risk surface and the ease of transmission of malware, for example. Assuming that the equipment is vulnerable. Potentially that's true, however, that may not be the case. It may be that the medical devices that our network, some of them they're quite old, or they use proprietary or embedded operating systems. That may or may not have vulnerabilities that have been discovered, unlike those that are constantly being discovered on commercial off the shelf systems or standard desktop operating systems. So some of these are fairly obscure. They're getting more attention now because of the interest in hacking and in cyber security. The information transmitted on the networks of those devices use might be very small subset of information. For example, only to transmit alarms or device status. It isn't the same type of information as we would find on network computers, for example, that have browsers. So again, it's a potentially different environment, somewhat complex. And the devil's in the details in terms of the potential for vulnerability. So, all of that, kind of a long way to say don't assume that connected, networked medical devices are the same as pool of network computers in a typical environment. They maybe function very differently.
