[MUSIC] In the previous lecture, we discussed how the dynamics of a weak institutional legacy with the very considerable practical problems of governance in the post colonial states, leads to the susceptibility of these new states to coup's and counter coup's and instability. And in this lecture, just as a means of illustrating this, I will look at four different countries out of the region that we will look at this week, and give you a very rough overview of the instability that existed. So, this is not a comprehensive view of the whole region, but the view is representative of the region. So what you will hear about these four countries is mirrored in the other countries. We have chosen these four countries because Nigeria is by far the most populous nation in Africa, and therefore by definition, important. Sudan is important because it has led to the secession of one part of it, and a very considerable international problem in the last couple of years. And also through the international mediation, to the end of a very long and very bloody civil war. Somalia likewise, is one of those countries where this structural inherent tendency to instability has actually led to state failure, a complete collapse of the state with all the accompanying problems, social, but also international that this accompanies. You probably have heard about the problem of piracy, for example. So that's one of the reasons we will look at Somalia. And then finally, we will also look at Mali for two reasons. One is that at the beginning of last year, you might remember that Mali itself experienced an internal uprising, a struggle with Islamist forces that then led to an international intervention. So putting Mali on the international map for awhile, but, perhaps more importantly, if you remember the last video. Mali is actually one of the emerging countries that Radelet's book has identified as one of those countries that have emerged from this period of turmoil, and have now started to put sensible socioeconomic policies in place. And we like to look at how this is reflected in the economic performance of all of these four countries, and then Mali serves a little bit as a contrast to the other three. So let's start with Nigeria, very briefly. Nigeria becomes independent in 1960. Just in the wave of many of the other countries that we have already discussed, and then you have here the first Prime MInister of independent Nigeria, is Sir Abubakar Balewa, and Nigeria is at that time a federal arrangement. Following the Westminster Democracy model that Britain bequeathed to most of its colonies, and then you might have heard in 1967, Nigeria suffers a very bloody secessionist civil war. Here the three Eastern states try to secede as the Republic of Biafra. So here you have the map and the flag that this impending republic gave itself, and it was a very bloody armed struggle in the course of which, very large numbers of civilians died. Up to 3 million died of starvation, because of the blockade by the federal forces to the republic. There was strong interference from both sides, but ultimately this secessionist region was reintegrated into Nigeria, and now we see Nigeria played out exactly what we discussed in the last video. There is throughout the 70's, 80's, and 90's, the country experiences coup after coup, after coup. There is, the military is s absolutely dominant and the different factions in the military, exactly what we referred to. Due primarily to the absence of other competing institutions. And now, you also might have followed that in 99, the period of military rule came to an end. We have the, Mr. Obasanjo here is now elected in a civilian take over of power, but what this is now, for the time being, has been the last military coup, but we don't know whether it will remain. Nigeria since then, has experienced a period of liberalization, both economically and politically. And, perhaps seemingly paradoxically, this liberalization has led to increased inter ethnic tensions. Remember, it's a story not totally dissimilar to what we learned when we looked at Indonesia. So military rule, central rule, is now relaxed, and the impending political space is filled by different groups competing primarily along ethnic and religious lines, and I'll come to that in a minute. But before we do that, you know that Nigeria has tremendous oil weath, and so it's probably a good idea to look at this chart that shows GDP growth per capita over time, and what is surprising for those of you who are not economists. These are in constant, I think, 2005 dollars, and if you look at these figures, it's constant dollars per year in yearly income, from 1960 to 2012 roughly, and there's very, very little increase. It's basically a stagnant line from here, right up to the 2000 years, and then we see a modest increase since then. And that is an extremely disappointing performance for a country with as much oil as Nigeria, and that already hints to the vast corruption and theft that is taking place with the national wealth. And these graphs, we show these graphs now for all the other countries, just as we did for Malaysia and Indonesia. So if you look at the green relatively stagnant graph, that shows population growth over time in percentage time, and you see it's a relatively high rate of annual population growth. And just as with the others, you see the blue line shows the GDP growth in percentage terms annually, and the red line is the GDP growth per capita, and it's offset precisely by the population rate of increase. And what you see here now are these enormous shifts, these waves in economic performance, here In the late 60's that coincides with the war in Biafra and the very steep decrease, and an increase again. But then you see, as the country is experiencing turmoil, the economy tanks each time there is turmoil, and then it recovers slightly, but by and large, we see a history that is not at all impressive. GDP performance that is more or less stagnant, it's not at all convincing, and that's precisely what I tried to tell you in the earlier lectures here. That the political turmoil, the equality of your institutions has a direct effect on your quality of life, and that is shown in these graphs that the average Nigerian is not seeing a lot of the benefits in oil. Now here the other story is related to it because it shows the quality, the lack of functioning institutions. This is the map we had discussed earlier on about the religious divide in the country. And it's in the area where the Muslim North and the Christian South meet, where we see most of the tension happening. And it's precisely because of the attempt by the northern states, now particularly, after the period of liberalization after 99, to impose Sharia law, where we see strong resistance. And the fact of ethnic division of the country is nicely illustrated in this map from the 2011 presidential elections, that show you that the support for each candidate, this is what the colors represent here, is neatly divided along ethnic and that coincides with religious lines. And that is obviously a problem that shows you the Nigerian political system has not been able to reach out to all of its citizens properly. Let's now look at Sudan. That is a very large country and that has had a very active conflict that was ultimately resolved through international mediation, reasons enough to pay attention to it. If you remember, Sudan achieved independence from the Anglo Egyptian condominium in 1956. Here's a picture of the flag raising at independence. And already two years later we have the first military coup, following the pattern that we discussed in the last video. And two years again after this, we have the civil war. In 1962, starts a civil war in the South. That civil war isn't ended but ten years later. But while we see series of military led governments in the center in Khartoum in the south, the grievances of the Christian animist Bantu people in the South are not responded to effectively by the central government in the North. Rather, the opposite, we see these military led governments in the North following opportunistic Islamization processes to bolster their otherwise rather shallow legitimacy. Again, try to think what we discussed when we talked about General Zia-ul-Haq coming to power in Pakistan. It's the same idea. You come to power, your basis for legitimacy is basically nonexistent simply because you had a few soldiers under command, and then you try to appeal to the population, try to appeal to existing normative values, in this case Islam. And we see a concerted effort of Islamization particularly under Nimeiry after 69 onwards. And that is obviously fuels the resentment in the South, we have the Civil War breaks out again in 1983, and then lasts right up to present year until the present era when it's finally then a negotiated agreement is created in 2005. Indeed, the comprehensive peace agreement that ends this civil war. And here we see the flag of this new entity in the South, and that's something that I'd like to highlight now that I mentioned in the last video. Here we see a government that inherits a state, inherits population that is fractured, that pursues policies that are very narrow-minded, gear ed to only one part of the population. And this map actually shows it rather well the distribution of the country into different groups. So basically the northern central government was pursuing policies only for the benefit of the northern Sudanese people, here highlighted in orange. And we don't need the full details of the comprehensive peace agreement, but in short, what the peace agreement does is the acknowledgement of the central government that it can no longer keep the people in the South in the center. So they agree on a transitionary period, after which the South will have a referendum, and the north agrees to accept the outcome of the referendum. And it's clear to everybody involved that they will vote for independence. And that's exactly what they did in 2011, when then South Sudan becomes independent and has been recognized now as an independent state. And just like in many of the other places we looked at, it's the existence of oil wealth, particularly in the central region. You see one of the areas that is still disputed is the yellow area that is still a bone of contention where fighting still exists. The comprehensive peace agreement has a wealth sharing component. So they now try to settle the disagreement and try to distribute the benefits more equally. And what I'd like you to now consider, if more far sighted, more constructive policies had been adopted 40 years earlier, this country did not have to reach the stage of separation and let alone the civil war that devastated it for decades. They've now reached exactly the position that they could have come up with already shortly after independence. But they probably didn't come up with because the institutions didn't allow moderate, reasonable people to come to power. Instead you had self interested military leaders with very, very narrow, very short sighted agendas. And that ultimately leads to the destruction, or in this case, the separation of the state. And this rather sorry state of affairs is reflected now in the economic performance of the country. Again, it's a country that has oil wealth, and not insignificant oil wealth. And if you look at this chart shows you per capita, GP per capita in absolute dollars. And this is a country that is dramatically underperforming economically, and this underperformance is also reflected in these charts, that we've shown you before. They've followed the same model before. You have a very high population. The rate of population growth and an extremely varied and overall not particularly impressive rate of economic growth. And interesting here is the last part of the chart. If you see, now with the loss off Southern Sudan, you see that the overall GDP of the country dramatically falls, obviously, because the oil wealth in the South is now gone and that's the price of the central government had to pay for foolish policies it pursued in the 40 years before. And, that's perhaps the one thing I'd like you to consider. Foolish policies impose costs that you have then to bear and in this case both in Nigeria and in Somalia. These are not costs that can be attributed to colonial forces. It's our decisions taken by the local elites and the local population as well. Which brings us to another place that is not doing particularly well, which is Somalia. You'll remember, as we discussed a number of lectures back, Somalia was created as the union from the former British protectorate and the formerly Italian held Trust territory. They form a union in 1960 and become independent. You remember that little video we showed you about the independence celebrations. And it's a reasonably stable, relatively, it's not particularly rich but it's doing okay. It's a society that is relatively at ease with itself. And here you see a contemporary image of the city of Mogadishu at the time. And then, just as in the other places, you have, in 1969, this gentleman, Muhammed Siad Barre, putsches himself to power, instigates a left-leaning socialist oriented regime, with very far reaching attempts at social engineering. Not dissimilar to what we hear in Afghanistan ,after the republic is pronounced in 73 under Daoud and particularly after 78, so the Communists take over. So we see not a dissimilar thing here. And again think of the context of the Cold War. He's heavily supported by the Soviet Union and obviously the Americans and everybody else are heavily supporting his opponents. But the country remains relatively stable for significant parts of his reign, it's just that it's not doing particularly well economically. But in 1991 he is ousted from power, and basically then the country descends into chaos. Warlords take over. This story not dissimilar to what we saw in Afghanistan and that is basically the result. The country, whatever existed there in forms of full institutions and physical infrastructure is completely destroyed. And if you look at the economic indicators, already you see here that the data is simply not available in a country where a state has collapsed. So much of the data stops here when Siad Barre is ousted. But also you see the population growth is extremely high. Following perhaps the end of conflict in the internal conflict. But also you see these extreme shifts in economic performance under Siad Barre. So this is a country that is dramatically underperforming, and as we all know, once he's ousted from power in '91, we have this very long period now of fratricidal, clan-based fighting, where in the early 90s you see foreign forces trying to impose power, led by the Americans that fails dramatically. Which shows you generally the limits of an external force it's ability to bring stability into a place and then ultimately in the last few years we have seen the rise of very dramatic, very radical, Islamist movements in Somalia, but in the last few years, hopefully we see, a certain degree of consolidation of the central government. Here's so, we see under the impact of African union forces together with the government in exile, they have, as you see on the right hand side of this map, they've now extended the reach of the claim by the central government, the areas in blue with the corresponding reduction in the area claimed by the Islamist forces. Now as a side note, or the third side note, you see the yellow area named Somaliland. This is the former British part of the formerly British protectorate that had seceded in the turmoil of the 1990s from the chaos in Somalia, and is actually experiencing decent degrees of stability. So it's almost an island of stability in this otherwise imploding failed state, but it's an area, it's an entity, that is not recognized by anybody in legal terms, but it enjoys de facto autonomy. And just as a last thing, we have, now, in 2012, for the first time since '67 presidential elections that were reasonably successful. And now, you can, I leave you to the newspapers and following the media, to see how this story in Somalia will play out. But the thing I'd like you to remember is that failed decisions by Somali leaders after gaining independence have led to the disintegration of the state. It's not an external force that came and destroyed the state. That's the take home, I think. Finally, what I'd like to talk to you is Mali, and the somewhat conflicting story we get from it because on the one hand, it started off reasonably well into independence. You remember, it joined the Union with Senegal. It had an equally skilled first president, Modibo Keita, equally skilled to Leopold Senghor. And it quickly becomes a one party state, a socialist oriented one party state. He leaves the French Currency union, and it follows the economic model of the Soviet Union, not dissimilar to what we discussed when we looked at the, at Syria or Iraq or Egypt, so that was the model in vogue at the time. Now Mali, like the other countries we looked at, experiences very large numbers of authoritarian interventions in the politics. It's not a democratic system as we would like to see. But after the end of the cold war we see now a shift in '92 towards a multi-party system. In '92, for the first time we have multi-party elections, the first democratically elected president is chosen. And since then, we have a period that induces observers like Radelet to describe Mali as now one of the emerging countries. It is, as you see here, it's now beginning, you know after a rather stagnant policy, it begins now in the early 90s a process of relatively modest but sustained economic growth. And that is a result of the end of Soviet support that allowed the government to pursue these, kind of to buying off opposition, but instead turn to reform. That's exactly the the logic that we had described. And it's, As part of this reform movement, it also tries to come to an agreement with the Tuareg minority in the north that were seeking greater autonomy. It's signs, in 2006, an Algerian-brokered peace agreement with them, and we see now a period of decent stability and decent economic growth happening here. Again, you see the economic picture that existed before is very, very, varied and shifting and continues to be quite problematic right up into the 90's. But there's here, the shift becomes a lot smaller and it becomes moderately but sustained positive. But what now happens in the wake of the Libyan Civil War is that heavily armed fighters that were defeated in the Libyan Civil War, they now moved south into Mali. The Tuareg's become rearmed, they recommence that struggle against the government. And they form an alliance with very extreme Islamist groups, and it's a short lived alliance. They fall out quickly after, I showed to you some while before, once these extremist groups turn to destroying the heritage, the Islamic heritage that existed in cities like Timbuktu and elsewhere. And ultimately we have a French military intervention that reinstalls the government in place and extends the government's reach over the north. And now we can hope that this cautiously, hopeful optimistic view that we saw from the early 1990s, whether that could extend or recommence now after this conflict has ended. But, What this short overview was hoped to show you is the practical implications of the weak institutional structures that these government inherited, the problematic nature of the political systems, and how this then affects the socioeconomic well-being of people in these places. And what places like Mali give us reason for cautious optimism, but as you see the history is by far not clear yet. And there are other places in Africa that have shown a much better response to the changed global environment. Ultimately, in the Muslim African states that we are looking at here, we see a sustained debate over the constitutional order. And that's something we will now look in the final video of this week when we look at the struggles that concerned the constitutional order, not least of which is the position of religion and Islamic law in the constitutional order. [MUSIC]
