0:04
Another example of this developing stateness, is that of Syria.
For Syria, there was a very sour taste of Arab union that hadn't worked
between Syria and Egypt, between 1958 and 1961.
And it was a very strong desire in Syria despite all the flare about Arab union and
Arab nationalism.
A very strong desire to protect their independence.
From the mid 1970s the uniform fabric of Ba'ath pan-Arab ideology in Syria,
started to show shades of territorial Syrian and Pan-Syrian nationalism.
[SOUND] It seems that Hafiz Asad like Saddam Hussein had reached
the conclusions, that since it was not realistic to expect complete Arab
unity to be quickly achieved.
It was necessary to satisfy the popular need for a more permanent political
basis of identification than a Syrian entity that was deemed illegitimate by
pan-Arab party doctrine and, as such, necessarily temporary.
[SOUND] While Hafiz Assad officially remained faithful to the party's long-term
vision of Arab unity, the Syrian leadership searched for a formula that
would bridge the gap between party ideals of Arab unity and political reality.
Just as Egypt had shifted away from the conflict with Israel,
Syria was desperately in need of a new strategic alignment that would
encompass Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians, and
enable the Syrians to establish some kind of parity with Israel.
Thus, the old motif of greater Syria was given a new lease on life by
the Ba'ath regime in service of Syria's state interest.
It's raison d'etre.
[SOUND] In later years, it did not disappear, and
actually became part of Ba'ath political thinking together with a more
traditional pan-Arabism that was coupled with notions of a more narrowly
defined territorial nationalism based on Syria's existing borders.
Thus, archeological finds of the Roman era in Syria gave
a great boost to a Syrian sense of national pride, and
were presented as evidence of the pre-Islamic historical greatness of Syria.
There wasn't even an effort to present these finds as part of the Arab heritage.
But rather, as part of Syria's past.
[SOUND] Occupation of large parts of Lebanon in 1976 by Syria, and
the interstate arrangement between these two states did not bring about
any change in the boundaries.
Syria continued to preserve the boundary between Syria and
Lebanon even though this was regarded in Ba'ath ideology as something
very artificial that shouldn't really be there.
And Greater Syria became a question more of strategic need,
rather than an ideological conviction.
It was all about serving the strategic needs of the Syrian state, and
Syria had indeed become a player in its own right.
It was now a stable and a powerful country.
The fountainhead and beating heart of Arabism in theory.
But the emphasis was on Syria far more than it was of Arabism.
[SOUND] Jordan and the Palestinians have also had their
development of stateness and the territorial identity
each one of these in their own particular way.
Palestinian-ness was quite unique.
Created in the crucible of 1948, the Nochba, the defeat by Israel.
And as opposed to other Arab states, searching for
some kind of usable past to give a measure of historical content
to their rather artificial territorial creations.
For the Palestinians, it was all about the loss of territory,
that served as the backbone of the cohesive collective memory.
4:01
The loss of Palestine being the backbone of their collective memory.
[SOUND] As for the Jordanians, their Jordanian-ness
was defined against the ultimate Palestinian Other.
Especially after the civil war between the Jordanian government and
the PLO in September 1970.
[SOUND] Since September 1970, there has been a very deliberate
promotion in Jordan of a particular Jordanian identity based
on a common past even if it is a bit of a historical invention.
The Jordanian identity was therefore portrayed as having existed as a separate
identity in Ottoman times in the 19th century.
And though this wasn't really so,
it became part of the Jordanian national narrative.
And therefore, if this is to be true, the foundation of the monarchy
was based on self-determination of the Jordanian people that was in existent,
people in the 1920s, and not a colonial fiat, as it had actually been in reality.
[SOUND] Like other Arab states seeking to create a territorial identity,
Jordan was also in search of a usable past.
And thus, Jordan was described as a wellspring of civilization ever since
the Roman conquests through the ancient Nabataeans of Jordan and the Muslim
conquests of the 7th century which all became part of Jordanian history.
[SOUND] Jordanian-ness was also founded on the uniqueness of the tribal,
monarchical compact as the core of Jordanian national identity.
The special association between the tribes and their support for
the monarchical regime in Jordan.
6:12
And this better political record is definitely related
to Jordan's being a homogeneous society in religious terms.
More than 90% of the Jordanians are Sunni Muslim Arabs.
Since 1948, it has become increasingly Palestinian.
And Palestinians presently constitute a majority
of just over 50% in Jordan of the East Bank alone.
That is not taking into account the West Bank territory occupied by Israel
since 1967.
But as tense as relations are between Jordanians and
Palestinians, the distinction between them are latter day 20th century ones.
They are skin deep in comparison to the far more profound,
sectarian fault lines such as between Sunnis and Shias that date back centuries.
7:06
The tribalism in Jordan has actually been mobilized far more in the service of
the state than against it.
In fact, the Jordanian state has become their political patrimony,
that is the political patrimony of the Jordanian tribes,
they have no other patrimony and they will fight to defend their own.
[SOUND] Therefore in Jordan, it was not just a top down exercise,
like in Iraq, but a bottom up one too,
whereby the tribes actively adopted the Jordanian identity as their own.
To the extent that they have actually become the main standard bearers of what
can be termed Jordanianism.
For more than a decade, Abdullah II, who has been in power since 1999,
has promoted the idea of Jordan first.
Jordan first being an example of the uninhibited will,
willingness to advance territorial identity.
Professor Asher SusserSenior Research Fellow
