8.7.1 Camp David, 2000 - Part 1

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來自 Tel Aviv University 的課程

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

247 個評分

Tel Aviv University

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

247 個評分

This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context. Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!

從本節課中

WEEK 4

The escalation and de-escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1973 to the present

8.1.1 The October Surprise - Part 16:16

8.1.2 The October Surprise - Part 24:33

8.2.1 The Egyptian-Israeli Peace - Part 16:43

8.2.2 The Egyptian-Israeli Peace - Part 26:23

8.3 The PLO and the 1982 War in Lebanon3:45

8.4.1 The First Palestinian Intifada - Part 15:11

8.4.2 The First Palestinian Intifada - Part 26:15

8.5.1 The Oslo Accords - Part 17:17

8.5.2 The Oslo Accords - Part 28:49

8.6 The Jordanian-Israeli Peace6:56

8.7.1 Camp David, 2000 - Part 16:46

8.7.2 Camp David, 2000 - Part 26:55

8.8 Unilateral Disengagement and Further Negotiations10:31

與講師見面

Professor Asher Susser
Senior Research Fellow
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

One of the last, most serious efforts of the Israelis,

to finally conclude an agreement with the PLO, and

to come to the finalization of all elements of the Oslo Accords,

took place in the negotiations in the summer of 2000 at Camp David

near Washington, under the auspices of President Clinton of the United States.

The negotiations at the summit of Camp David in the summer of

2000 that continued for a few months thereafter as well until,

early 2001, were essentially negotiations that took

place between the newly elected Labor Government in Israel,

headed by Ehud Barak that came into office in 1999,

and the PLO headed by Yasser Arafat.

Briefly after his election, Barak tried to achieve

an agreement with Syria actually putting the PLO on the back burner for a moment.

But the negotiations with Syria did not result in any kind of success.

And consequently, Barak returned to the Palestinian track.

There was a sense of urgency on the Israeli side,

that the time had to be exploited as long as President Clinton was still in office.

By a, a dramatic move like the Camp David summit to finally

conclude the historical agreement between Israel and

the PLO, then the Palestinian people.

Ehud Barak therefore came to Camp David with the territorial offer.

More generous than any Israeli government had made to the Palestinians,

it was, in the Israeli mind, very far reaching.

But from the Palestinian point of view it fell far short.

And this difference of perceptions related to the different points of departure that

the Israelis and the Palestinians came from in their negotiations at Camp David.

The Israeli offer initially started off with a willingness to withdraw from

about 80% of the West Bank.

This was a lot more than the Israeli's had offered the Palestinians at any

time before, but it was far less than what the Palestinians expected, and

what they regarded as the bare minimum.

The Palestinians expected Israel to withdraw from all of the West Bank,

not from 80% of it.

From the Israeli point of view, this was a,

a Palestinian all-or-nothing argument, an unwillingness to compromise.

But from the Palestinian point of view, it was a very different reality.

What the Palestinians argued was that Israel already had 78% of

historical Palestine.

That is, Israel within the boundaries that existed until 1967.

The West Bank and Gaza were just the 22% of Palestine that remained.

And the Palestinians did not want to concede on that only 22%.

The Israeli point of departure was 1967.

The Palestinians however, were coming from 1948.

This made agreement very difficult indeed.

So if that wasn a major problem on the territorial issue,

there were equally difficult problems on Jerusalem.

It was understood by the parties at Camp David that Jerusalem would be divided.

This, from the Israeli point of view was a very significant departure

from the Israeli traditional position as it had been since 1967,

that all of Jerusalem should belong to Israel as Israel's undivided capital.

Here the Israelis were willing to concede that the city ought to be divided and

the idea was, and acceptable to the Palestinians too,

that the city of Jerusalem should be divided on an ethnic basis.

That is, Jewish residential areas would remain the state of Israel, and

Arab-Palestinian residential areas would become part of the state of Palestine.

The problem however, that proved to be intractable,

was what was to be done with the holy sites of Temple Mount?

Those that are for the Jewish people the holiest of holy, and those that

are the third holiest place on earth for the Muslims after Mecca and Medina.

The Muslim religious sites on the mount and

the Israeli Jewish Wailing Wall one side of it, and

holy remains of the Second Temple beneath the Muslim holy places on the mount.

The parties were unable to agree on how the mount ought to be divided,

if divided at all.

From the Palestinian point of view,

Temple Mount had to be under Palestinian Muslim sovereignty.

That was unacceptable to the Israelis who regarded the,

the area as part of the most holy of places to the Jewish people.

And therefore the issue of sovereignty remained one

over which there was no agreement.

But perhaps even more difficult than the issue of Temple Mount,

was the issue of Palestinian refugees and the question of the right of return.

The Israelis would not accept the right of return of Palestinian refugees to

Israel proper.

That, in the Israeli mind, would change the nature of the Israeli state from

the state of the Jewish people into something

very different which they could not possibly accept after the war of 1948 for

which they, in their own view, were only partly responsible.

On the Palestinian side, the argument was that for the right of return to be of any

value at all, it was not the Israelis who should decide on who returned to Israel.

The right of return was not really a right, the Palestinians argued, unless

the Palestinian refugees had a free choice of whether to return to Israel or not.

That, the Israelis could not accept.

And therefore you have this unbridgeable gap on

the issue of free Palestinian choice.

The Palestinians demanding a free choice for the refugees to return to Israel, and

Israel demanding the right of a sovereign state to admit only who it wished to

admit to its territory.

The failure on this issue was therefore inevitable.

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