5.5.1.2 The Surprising Stability of the Arab Monarchies: Jordan - Part 2

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來自 Tel Aviv University 的課程

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

248 個評分

Tel Aviv University

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

248 個評分

This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context. Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!

從本節課中

WEEK 1

Independence and revolutionary politics in the Arab world

V. Arab Independence and Revolution1:48

5.1.1 Egypt: Crisis and Revolution - Part 18:25

5.1.2 Egypt: Crisis and Revolution - Part 26:21

5.2.1 Iraq from the Overthrow of the Hashemites to Saddam Hussein - Part 18:18

5.2.2 Iraq from the Overthrow of the Hashemites to Saddam Hussein - Part 27:29

5.3.1 Syria's Prolonged Instability - Part 18:29

5.3.2 Syria's Prolonged Instability - Part 28:15

5.4.1 Lebanon's Civil Wars - Part 17:28

5.4.2 Lebanon's Civil Wars - Part 29:55

5.5. The Surprising Stability of the Arab Monarchies3:37

5.5.1.1 The Surprising Stability of the Arab Monarchies: Jordan - Part 19:06

5.5.1.2 The Surprising Stability of the Arab Monarchies: Jordan - Part 27:57

5.5.2 The Surprising Stability of the Arab Monarchies: Saudi Arabia8:13

5.6 The Arab Cold War2:16

與講師見面

Professor Asher Susser
Senior Research Fellow
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

In the aftermath of Black September, Jordan underwent a process

of Jordanization, which now meant the exclusion of Palestinians with

very few exceptions from virtually all positions of influence.

In the kingdom.

Thus, a functional cleavage was created between Jordanians and Palestinians.

Palestinians were almost entirely excluded from government but

were predominant in the private sector with a controlling influence in

the Jordanian economy and much of the professional class.

Jordanians, on the other hand, were predominant in the bureaucracy.

And the security establishment and,

generally, far more dependent on government employment and social services.

Jordan's national priorities were shifting towards the East Bank,

as the involvement in the West Bank and the Palestine cause was increasingly seen

by at least some members of the Jordanian League as an unnecessary burden.

After all, after the Civil War of 1970, there were many in Jordan

who were suspicious, and distrustful of the Palestinians in Jordan, and

therefore there were many in the Jordanian elite who thought that Jordan would be

best served by disengaging from the West Bank and from the Palestinian cause.

In the 1973 war in which Egypt and Syria launced a surprise attack on Israel,

Jordan stayed out of a direct confrontation with Israel.

And refrained from opening a third front against Israel along the Jordanian border.

Jordan only participated partially and indirectly by sending some of it's forces.

To assist the Syrians in their battle with the Israelis on the Golan.

Jordan's limited participation made it all the more difficult after the war for

Jordan to maintain its recognized role in the Palestine question.

In October 1974 after an intensive struggle.

Jordan was compelled to concede the mantle of Palestinian representation to the PLO,

which was recognized by the Arab League as the sole

legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Jordan was thus disqualified as a contender for

retrieving the West Bank from Israel.

And king Hussein as opposed to others in the elite was extremely reluctant

to finally concede on Palestine.

Since the late 1950s he had argued passionately that Jordan was Palestine and

Palestine was Jordan as a way of emphasizing Jordan's

permanent role in Palestine.

But as of the mid 80s he began to change course too.

Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine he now proclaimed.

He realized that the slogan of Jordanese Palestine was working against Jordan

as Israelis and

Palestinians could use it to further their respective agendas against Jordan.

That is to transform Jordan Ba'aths into the state of the Palestinians.

In December 1987,

the first Palestinian uprising against Israel broke out in the West Bank in Gaza.

And in the West Bank there were strident Anti-Jordanian protests too.

Hussein finally came to the conclusion

that his Palestinian aspirations were beyond reach.

And he declared Jordan's official disengagement from the West Bank

in July 1988.

The late 1980s were also bad times for Jordan's economy.

And in 1989 Jordan faced serious domestic instability.

As a result of the economic crisis.

The crisis was very much a consequence of the inability of Jordan's resource

strapped economy to make ends meat at a time of rapid population growth.

Jordan had no choice but to follow the neo-liberal economic advice.

Of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and

to drastically cut government spending and privatize public enterprises.

The cut back in government spending was especially damaging

to the original Jordanians, the loyal backbone of the monarchy.

Who were far more dependent than their Palestinian compatriots

on government spending and on government jobs.

Privatization also seemed to benefit the.

Palestinians in the private sector at the expense of the original Jordanians.

Whether this was really true or not didn't matter.

This is what the public believed.

And original Jordanians began to feel that their unwritten social contract with

the Hashemite monarchy, which prescribed unfettered loyalty in exchange for

employment and economic security was being undermined by the monarchy.

Cracks did begin to appear in the edifice of the Jordanian unswerving loyalty

to the regime.

The problem was handled with much skill and forbearance by Hussein.

Matched by the ground swell of support and

even admiration that the Jordanians as a whole had for the king.

In his last years in power.

One of the King's motivations for making peace with Israel in 1994 was the belief

that it would not only serve Jordan's interests in regional stability and

security but that the peace dividend would also greatly benefit Jordan's economy.

This unfortunately proved to be an unrealistic assumption.

And Hussein died after 46 years at the helm in February 1999.

He was succeeded by his eldest son Abdullah,

who had much more difficulty in keeping everyone happy.

In recent years, condemnation of King Abdullah has regularly been

heard from within the inner sanctums of the East Banker Jordanian elite.

The outbreak of the Arab Spring in other countries in late 2010 and early 2011.

Provided a convenient background for

some of the more embittered Jordanians to vent their disapproval of the king.

Abdullah the Second doesn't quite have the charisma and

monarchical presence of his father.

Nor does he have the kind of intimacy his father had with the Bedouin tribes.

Abdullah.

Born to a British mother and having grown up and

been educated mostly abroad in England and the US is seen as a bit of an outsider.

While both the non-Islamist East Bankers and

mainly Palestinian Islamists call for greater democratization.

The East Bankers actually have a serious dilemma around this issue.

They want more influence in determining how wealth and

power are distributed in the kingdom.

But they are hardly interested in a democratization process that would almost

certainly empower the Islamists and the Palestinians at their expense.

Therefore, not withstanding the cracks in the edifice of the East Banker elite,

the fractious opposition has yet

to come up with a viable alternative to the Status quo.

And thanks to the three historical stabilizing factors,

that still predominantly loyal elite.

The unshaking reliability of the security establishment, and the external support

of regional players like Saudi Arabia and international powers, like the US.

They have, thus far, the Jordanians,

successfully weathered the various storms of Middle Eastern politics.

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