[MUSIC] War is currently defined as a conflict among states using military force. Traditional vision, war is the normal results of the the interstate rivalry. It's exactly what Raymond pointed out when he said that it's only the result of the traditional, the current rivalry among nation states. And war is considered also as paroxysm of this rivalry. The rivalry is lasting but when it is at its peak, we are in a war situation, that's why in our European history, war is consider as normal in an international arena. And we know now why, if we take into account what Thomas Hobbes said, he explained that states were like gladiators in the international arena. That's to say, they are permitted to use all the means for dominating their revolts. All the means including force, every kind of force. That's why in this vision, peace is only ending to war. Peace doesn't exist by itself. And it is probably one of the most pessimistic feature of our western vision of international relations. War is at the center, at the core of international relation, when peace is considered as a no war situation between two wars. This pessimistic vision is important to take into account because in this ops construction, we mean, we envisioned that war is synonymous of international relations. The science of international relations is considered as the science of war, no room for peace. And this is probably one of the most pessimistic vision that we can have on our international relation studies. But behind this pessimistic vision, there is something very important for us. That's to say to consider that war is functional. War is functional for several reasons. The first one is at war is considered as an instrument for achieving competition of amongst states. War is the only way for overcoming the disputes amongst states. A search is considered as functional. But war is also functional for reassesing power of states, for redistributing powers, for redefining the condition of balancing powers among states. War is also functional for drawing territories, for drawing borderlines. War, overall, is considered as functional because war is the major instrument of state making. We go back to this very famous American sociologist and historian, Charles Tilly, who claim that war making is a way of state making. If you take into account these three of the European state, taxes were adopted, taxes were defined by wars in Europe, in our European history. State administration was created during war and by wars. State legitimacy was redefined and enhanced by wars. Nation, nation building was strongly defined, was strongly organized structures by wars. And this is probably one of the main points stressed by the famous German philosopher and lawyer, Carl Schmitt, who claim that enmity is functional for nation building. Without an enemy, a nation is not able to develop properly. The nation needs an enemy for existing, for being at the very center of the history of the collectivity which is led to be transformed in a nation. Without an enemy, no nation, no strong nation. This is a terrible formula but one of the cornerstones of our European histories. Enmity inside Europe was the main instrument for shaping the political map of the old continent. Our European history, our European map, have been shaped by war, and this is also explaining the fragmentation process which took place along the history of modern Europe, the contemporary. And so completes prodigal map of Europe is mainly structured by the succession of wars which took place from the Westphalia Treaty up to the two world wars. Charles Tilly explained that this vision leads to the famous concept that he coined, the concept of racket state. A state which has the purpose to reinforce, to enhance its capacity, is using the strength for mobilizing his own citizen. And so, Charles Tilly explained that during the European history, states were even creating, inventing. And security threats for mobilizing their own citizens for enhancing the level of the nation building in size every state constituting the European map. What about now? The first question is, this is the European history. Is this the European history relevant for explaining other histories? Is it true elsewhere? What I explained about this relationship between state making and war making is really conformed to other histories? Is it possible to explain the South America, or North America, or Asian histories through this paradigm? I don't think so. This war making, state making process is a European process and is oddly exportable to other histories. Second question, what about now? Now, we are facing a new kind of war. If we go back to the definition that I gave to the traditional war, this definition is no more relevant. First, because these new wars are not mainly made by state actors, but non-state actors. Is the non-state actor war able to achieve the same function that I described about the traditional war and what about the territorial background? I don't say that territorial disputes don't have any room now, but the role of territorial dispute in organizing, in triggering war is less important than it was previously. The territorial background does not have the same meaning now that it had previously. What about also this new kind of war in which the interstate playing is not so essential, is not so crucial, is no more at the core of the international conflict as it was previously. What about a world in which the concept of enemy has not the same relevance. That's to say, we are now in a world in which rivalry does not have the same meaning it had previously, and in which enmity does not have the same relevance. Ladies and gentlemen, our culture of war is coming from a limited history. That's to say, sequence of the European history, but only of European history and is not relevant for all other cultures and other histories. That's why our vision must reconsider our present world, reconsider the present wars and to imagine what are the new international conflicts. [MUSIC]
