[MUSIC] It's a kind of paradox, the concept of international system which is to be so obvious and so important has not been used in international relation theory. That's particularly strange as the realisary gives us a macrovision of international politics. But realism was a little bit reluctant to the concept of system which implies an idea of order. For the realist there is no order in the international arena as it is a permanent fight among gladiators. It's a kind of anarchy and so we had to wait for the great moment of the system theory for observing the first uses of the concept of international system, that's to say around the 60's or 70's, so very late. My purpose is to define what is an international system, which is not so obvious too. How to define it. And after, I will offer a lecture on what is multilateralism, that is to say how multilateralism is shaping the international system. And then, we have to take into account the famous problem of polarity. Are we facing a unipolar or a multipolar or a post bipolar system? What does it mean? What is an intersocial system. I would say that an intersocial system Is a state of international life. A moment of sequence of the international life. It is made for helping to describe, and to understand constraints weighing on actions and relations. It is, I would say, a set of international practices, then can be identified at a given sequence of the time. Is to define the criteria of the international system. If the international system is the moment of the international life, how to save this moment. How to describe this moment. Which kind of variable as to be used and mobilize for describing the international role I will sell it for criteria. For variables which are explaining the transformation of the international system. First one is degree of inclusiveness. Is the international system including all the potential actors? All the potential actors. It means first all the states, all the sovereign states, and we have to take into account something very important and even crucial for the international system. That generally all the state actors don't participate in the international system. If we observe the European 19th century international system, it was limited to Europe. It pretends to cover all the world and to take into account what, for instance, took place in Latin America. But however, Only European states were participating in the China or in empire were not admitted as members of the international system and with the Monroe doctrine US didn't accept to participate in this kind of international system. And now the problem is, what about developing countries? Formally of course, they are members of the international system but sometimes late members, if you take into account for instance, the decolonization process these, the recolonization process took place during the 60's, mainly during the 60's and so before 1960 the major part of the world was not actively participating in the international system. Now another question is what about the nonstate actors? That's to say is the inclusiveness of the international system also covering non-state taxes which are more and more active, more and more relevant inside the international arena but which don't really participate in the second variable would be what about the deliberation. An international system can be identified through its way of deliberating. That's to say, how deliberation is going on. What are the institutions, the procedures, and what are the members of the international system which are really participating, actively participating in the decision. And so we have to observe that for the major parts of the international systems. Those ones where oligarchic or even diarchic that's to say we have to take into account the difference between active states, which are really participating in the decision making process, and passive states. For instance, now, with the P5, that's to say, the five permanent member of the security council of the UN. Only five sovereign states are really active states in the international arena, and the others have to follow. If now we take into account the G group, that's to say G7, or G8, or G20, all the other members are not participating in the decision making process. And so we can say that this deliberation is really obligated and so we can classify the international systems according to their real participation of the actors to the decision. Third criterion, it would be the alliances which are composing the international system. Are these alliances structured or not? Are they covering all the states of the world or not? Only a small part. Are they lasting? Like Nato for instance created In 1949 up to now are other precarious this is another variable. And the last one will be of course the type of power and domination which is a inside the international system. Either an ingemining power. Is there a condominium, or is there a decentralized power inside the international system. If now we try to classify the international system. So we have to take into account not to fall into three traps. The first one would be obsession with polarization. Considering that all the international systems are polarized, that's not true. Polarization as we will see is an exception. What about the nonpolarized international system. The second trap would be the absence of a social dimension. That's to say the international system is not only made of state actors. It's not only made of sovereign states, but more and more as we saw previously, more and more by nonstate actors. What are these nonstate actors, how to classify them, and how to consider their participation in the international life. And the third tribe would be disregarding the temporal factors. That's to say international system is not a stable one. An international system is moving, is transforming and this information is probably at the core of the international rises If for putting an end to this lecture I considered different kinds of international system I would say that for instance beginning with the Vienna congress in 1815 from 1818. We had a kind of oligarchy joint management that's to say the four winners of the war against Napoleon were co managing the international system. From 1818 up to 1871, that's to say the creation of Germany, I would say that we have an unstable and a conniving coalition. Fragile, unstable, fragile coalition among the major European powers. But without a real command management, a kind of this sweet and limited competition. From 1871 up to 1914, that’s to say the beginning of the First World War, We have a conniving antagonism that's to say alliances which will result in the confrontation of the first world war. From 1918 up to 1939 that we'll say the second world war we have a very fluid. International system without any structuration and without a very fast transformation of the traditions and alliances. Now, from 1945 up to 47, very brief period just after the war, we had a kind of Fragile joined Manajarine, the kind of condominium between USSR and US who were the two winners of the Second World War. I mean, the main two winners of the Second World War. From 1947 up to Sixty seven, we had a rigid bi polarity. From 67 up to 89, that's to say the origin of the berlin wall. We had a dire polarization from 89 up to 94. We had a limited unipolarity around US which was the real winner of the cold war and from 94 up to now we have a kind of fragmented apolarity, without a clear in Germany, without a clear structuration and back of the system is not very clear. It's coined caused by Peru's system without deciding exactly on the content of this international system. [MUSIC]
