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完成時間大約為36 小時

建議:10 weeks of study, 4 hours per week...

英語(English)

字幕:英語(English)

100% 在線

立即開始,按照自己的計劃學習。

可靈活調整截止日期

根據您的日程表重置截止日期。

完成時間大約為36 小時

建議:10 weeks of study, 4 hours per week...

英語(English)

字幕:英語(English)

教學大綱 - 您將從這門課程中學到什麼

1
完成時間為 2 小時

The firm

Our first lecture is devoted to building a microeconomic foundation, which is necessary for understanding the lectures to come. In the beginning segment we will say a few words about the course and, then, we will focus on the concept of the firm. We will try to define what a firm actually is and why business is organized based on the notion of the firm. We will talk about technology, economies of scale, concentration, informational asymmetries, hold-up and we will present our first case study: GM vs. Fisher Body. It may seem to you that you have heard some of this lecture’s terms before, or you already know them, but reviewing them and deeply understanding them will be essential for the continuation of the course....
10 個視頻 (總計 83 分鐘), 2 個閱讀材料, 1 個測驗
10 個視頻
1. Tour of the course4分鐘
2. What is a firm?7分鐘
3. The technological view12分鐘
4. Economies and concentration6分鐘
5. Incomplete contract9分鐘
6. Informational asymmetries10分鐘
7. Long-run relationship8分鐘
8. Vertical relationship model11分鐘
9. Case: GM vs. Fisher Body9分鐘
2 個閱讀材料
Welcome note2分鐘
Readings & Links2分鐘
1 個練習
The firm
2
完成時間為 3 小時

Game theory foundations

In this lecture we will focus on the principles of strategic interaction. The most important tool to understand strategy is game theory. We will define and explain different categories of games. The ultimate goal of this lecture is to enable you to use game theory so that you can model interaction and negotiations. We will talk about equilibrium in dominant strategies, which is a non-strategic equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium and the prisoner’s dilemma. We will get acquainted with static, repeated and dynamic games. I will tell you a real story of prisoner’s dilemma and we will have an extended example on firm interaction with “Energon vs. Orange”....
10 個視頻 (總計 98 分鐘), 1 個閱讀材料, 1 個測驗
10 個視頻
2. The bi-matrix and strict dominance10分鐘
3. Dominant Equilibrium6分鐘
4. Nash Equilibrium13分鐘
5. Interesting cases of NE8分鐘
6. The prisoner’s dilemma5分鐘
7. Case: The cheater’s dilemma10分鐘
8. Repeated games10分鐘
9. Dynamic games8分鐘
10. Example: Energon vs. Orange13分鐘
1 個閱讀材料
Readings & Links2分鐘
1 個練習
Game theory foundations
3
完成時間為 3 小時

Static competition

The topic of this lecture is short-run competition. That is, interaction that lasts only for one period. Static competition is not the most usual form of competition but it is not rare, either. Most of the principles that we will present in this lecture will carry over to the dynamic competition analysis later. There are two different kinds of static competition. The first is when strategic variables have a positive causative relationship, as in competition with prices. The second is when the strategic variables are negatively related, as in competition with quantities. We will cover interesting notions such as first-mover advantage, the Bertrand Paradox, capacity constraints, differentiated products, and will introduce the notion of collusion that will be of major importance for our future lectures....
10 個視頻 (總計 95 分鐘), 1 個閱讀材料, 1 個測驗
10 個視頻
2. Competition in quantities12分鐘
3. Application: Linear demand – constant cost11分鐘
4. First mover advantage12分鐘
5. Competition in prices9分鐘
6. The Bertrand Paradox5分鐘
7. Capacity constraints8分鐘
8. Differentiated products9分鐘
9. Application: Differentiated products6分鐘
10. The prospect of collusion10分鐘
1 個閱讀材料
Readings & Links2分鐘
1 個練習
Static competition
4
完成時間為 3 小時

Dynamic competition

We extend the analysis of competition introducing interactions with time depth. We will use several concepts from the previous lectures but here we have two important qualitative differences. When competition lasts for more than one period, players develop reputations and are given the opportunity to retaliate in case they are cheated upon. Reputation and retaliation may alter the outcome of interaction in comparison to interactions that last only for one period. We will talk about repetitive and dynamic interactions, collusion, renegotiation, price wars, antitrust and detection mechanisms....
10 個視頻 (總計 100 分鐘), 1 個閱讀材料, 1 個測驗
10 個視頻
2. Infinite horizon12分鐘
3. Renegotiation9分鐘
4. Price wars14分鐘
5. Establishing collusion14分鐘
6. Complications: asymmetries and heterogeneity7分鐘
7. Complications: volatility and structure8分鐘
8. Antitrust9分鐘
9. Prosecution is not straightforward8分鐘
10. Detection6分鐘
1 個閱讀材料
Readings & Links2分鐘
1 個練習
Dynamic competition
5
完成時間為 2 小時

Deterrence and predation

Our fifth lecture focuses on games where firms are in different stages of the competition game. In this setting there exists a monopolistic firm already in the market, while another firm considers entering this market in the future. We will examine how the incumbent firm will be affected by the prospect of entrance. We will cover all basic principles of deterrence for the protection of the incumbent’s territory. We will talk about, credibility, empty threats, preemption, contestability and strategic relevance. We will examine the four general business strategies for deterrence and we will see a very intriguing paradox that can teach us a lot about credibility and the importance of reputation....
8 個視頻 (總計 82 分鐘), 1 個閱讀材料, 1 個測驗
8 個視頻
2. Dynamic deterrence: setting10分鐘
3. Dynamic deterrence: preemption8分鐘
4. The chain-store paradox14分鐘
5. Strategic relevance6分鐘
6. General entry setting12分鐘
7. The 4 business strategies11分鐘
8. Contestable markets6分鐘
1 個閱讀材料
Readings & Links2分鐘
1 個練習
Deterrence and predation
6
完成時間為 3 小時

Price discrimination

The topic for this lecture is pricing. In general in economics, we are used in a paradigm in which firms set only one price for each of their products. Sometimes this is indeed the case but, often, we observe that firms charge different prices to different consumers or different occasions or different purchased quantities. In reality, when a firm has some market power and the consumers are each not willing to pay the same for every unit, the firm can price-discriminate to increase its profits. We will analyze the three degrees of price discrimination, tying, bundling and several other methods of advanced pricing. We will also present a brilliant pricing case study with Polaroid....
9 個視頻 (總計 96 分鐘), 1 個閱讀材料, 1 個測驗
9 個視頻
2. First degree PD12分鐘
3. Third degree PD6分鐘
4. Second degree PD10分鐘
5. The Polaroid case of tie-in sales13分鐘
6. Quantity discounts, block pricing, coupons11分鐘
7. Intertemporal, peak-load, special editions14分鐘
8. Bundling10分鐘
9. Legal framework for PD4分鐘
1 個閱讀材料
Readings & Links2分鐘
1 個練習
Price Discrimination
7
完成時間為 2 小時

Product differentiation

In our previous lectures we have come to the conclusion that when firms compete with price, the Bertrand paradox leads those firms to lose their entire market power. In today’s lecture we will try to resolve this paradox assuming that the firms can differentiate their products. Differentiation has two dimensions. The horizontal, where beliefs for the quality of the product are subjective; and the vertical, where beliefs for quality are objective. We will present two models for horizontal differentiation: the linear and the circular city. We will also cover the Nobel award winning model of differentiation in quality. We will talk about brand proliferation and will examine how it can be effective as a deterrence mechanism. Additionally, we will have two entertaining case studies on the costs of withdrawal and rebranding....
7 個視頻 (總計 87 分鐘), 1 個閱讀材料, 1 個測驗
7 個視頻
2. The linear city12分鐘
3. Dynamic linear city13分鐘
4. Circular location13分鐘
5. Proliferation13分鐘
6. Two rebranding tragedies11分鐘
7. Differentiation in quality14分鐘
1 個閱讀材料
Readings & Links2分鐘
1 個練習
Product differentiation
8
完成時間為 2 小時

Vertical relations

So far, we have mostly examined the markets in the context of the “firm – customers” relationship. In this lecture our analysis extends to more complicated relationships such that of “manufacturer – retailer – customers”. We will also generalize our setting to include all kinds of vertical relations between firms. When firms are vertically related, we observe an interesting phenomenon that creates tension between the two partners. This phenomenon is referred to as “double marginalization” and creates a vertical externality at the upstream market. Additionally, the opportunity of a retailer to provide demand stimulating pre-sale services may create a horizontal externality, causing the provision of service to end up sub-optimal. We will talk about resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, exclusive territories and the importance of modern distribution systems. We will also present two interesting case studies: the Levi’s Strauss case and the “free corporate refrigerators” case....
9 個視頻 (總計 81 分鐘), 1 個閱讀材料, 1 個測驗
9 個視頻
2. Vertical restraints11分鐘
3. Pre-sale services8分鐘
4. Resale Price Maintenance11分鐘
5. The Levi’s Strauss case11分鐘
6. Exclusive dealing4分鐘
7. Case: Coke and Pepsi refrigerators11分鐘
8. Exclusive territories and modern practices6分鐘
9. Distribution systems and Policy6分鐘
1 個閱讀材料
Reading & Links2分鐘
1 個練習
Vertical relations
9
完成時間為 3 小時

Networks and platforms

Our ninth lecture explores a modern and quite useful topic. We will examine the economics of networks and platforms. In contrast with usual markets, networks have a key feature: the value of a network good to a consumer depends on the total number of consumers of this good. Platforms often exhibit network effects. That is, when a platform signs up one additional user, the increase in revenues exceeds the value of the subscription of the new user because the platform becomes more attractive for all other current or potential users. We will talk about cutting edge economic notions: stability of equilibrium, critical mass, path dependence and platform instruments. We will also present two fascinating case studies: the OS platforms and the video game platforms....
9 個視頻 (總計 91 分鐘), 1 個閱讀材料, 1 個測驗
9 個視頻
2. Network model13分鐘
3. Stability of equilibrium11分鐘
4. Critical mass7分鐘
5. Path dependence9分鐘
6. Platforms vs. markets10分鐘
7. Platform instruments4分鐘
8. Case: The OS platforms14分鐘
9. Case: Video game platforms12分鐘
1 個閱讀材料
Readings & Links2分鐘
1 個練習
Networks and platforms
10
完成時間為 2 小時

Intellectual property

In our last lecture we will get acquainted with the concept of intellectual property and its institutional protection. Intellectual property becomes more and more relevant as our lives become more and more digital. IP is not a straightforward concept. Its definition can be complicated and tricky and its application may vary from one jurisdiction to another. In our lecture we will examine some basic principles that are internationally standard. We will understand the basics of copyright, patents, trade secrets and trademarks. We will talk about the international protection of IP and, of course, we will have several examples for all complicated notions. Also, this is our last lecture and our end segment is reserved for the “final note”....
8 個視頻 (總計 74 分鐘), 1 個閱讀材料, 1 個測驗
8 個視頻
2. Not a straightforward issue6分鐘
3. Copyright7分鐘
4. Nature, rights and duration9分鐘
5. Patents and trade secrets12分鐘
6. Trademarks10分鐘
7. International IP9分鐘
8. Final note – Good bye4分鐘
1 個閱讀材料
Readings & Links2分鐘
1 個練習
Intellectual property

講師

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Kosmas Marinakis

Assistant Professor
ICEF and Faculty of Economics Sciences, HSE

關於 国立高等经济大学

National Research University - Higher School of Economics (HSE) is one of the top research universities in Russia. Established in 1992 to promote new research and teaching in economics and related disciplines, it now offers programs at all levels of university education across an extraordinary range of fields of study including business, sociology, cultural studies, philosophy, political science, international relations, law, Asian studies, media and communicamathematics, engineering, and more. Learn more on www.hse.ru...

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